Abstract: Sharing information to others is common nowadays, but the question is with whom to share. To address this problem, we propose the notion of secret transfer with access structure (STAS). STAS is a twoparty computation protocol that enables the server to transfer a secret to a client who satisfies the prescribed access structure. In this paper, we focus on threshold secret transfer (TST), which is STAS for threshold policy and can be made more expressive by using linear secret sharing. TST enables a number of applications including a simple construction of oblivious transfer (OT) with threshold access control, and (a variant of) threshold private set intersection (t-PSI), which are the first of their kinds in the literature to the best of our knowledge. The underlying primitive of STAS is a variant of OT, which we call OT for a sparse array. We provide two constructions which are inspired by state-of-the-art PSI techniques including oblivious polynomial evaluation (OPE) and garbled Bloom filter (GBF). The OPEbased construction is secure in the malicious model, while the GBF-based one is more efficient. We implemented the latter one and showed its performance in applications such as privacy-preserving matchmaking.
based services should only share information between users who are in proximity, or dating apps in which users may only want to share information based on (mutual) interests of the profiled attributes. Since users may not want to reveal their whereabouts or their attributes, the criteria of whom to share may be sensitive as well. Moreover, expecting an exact match may be a bit idealistic, e.g., it may be difficult to find someone via dating apps who matches every single desired attributes.
Deciding whom to share may involve comparison of two sets of elements. Also, computing the intersection of two sets is useful in various scenarios, e.g., two Facebook users may check who are their common friends before accepting befriend request; two companies want to find the number of common customers before launching a joint promotion; or apps like tworlds which share photos to a random stranger across the globe simply based on the supplied hashtags. A straightforward approach requires two parties to reveal their sets and then compute the result locally. However, the sets might contain valuable information that should not be disclosed for economic reasons or the sets are too sensitive to reveal. Revealing only the intersection or only its size, while protecting the confidentiality of elements which are not in the intersection, is an important task.
Private set intersection (PSI) can solve the above problem. It involves two parties: a client and a server, each holding a private set C and S respectively. PSI allows the client to learn the intersection C ∩ S of their sets, while the server usually learns nothing. If both parties need to learn C ∩ S, they can switch roles and engage in a second PSI instance. A variant called PSI cardinality (PSI-CA) only reveals the cardinality |C ∩ S| (e.g., [19] ). State-of-the-art PSI protocols are very efficient (e.g., [17, 41, 42] ). PSI has found numerous applications, e.g., bot-net detection [37] , proximity testing [38] , biometric pattern matching [46] , etc. Sec. 8 will describe more PSI-related applications.
PSI with Access Structure
This paper considers a general PSI which only reveals the sets when the intersection satisfies a certain structure. A notable example is threshold PSI (t-PSI), which only reveals the intersection set C ∩ S when the size of the intersection |C ∩ S| is larger than a pre-agreed threshold t. When t = 0, t-PSI is equivalent to PSI; when t = |C|, t-PSI is equivalent to PSI-CA. We consider t-PSI as a natural and useful extension to PSI.
Designing an efficient t-PSI protocol (without resorting to generic secure multiparty computation) is not an easy task, as observed by Pinkas et al. [42] . By using the garbled circuit approach, one can add subsequent computation in a privacy-preserving manner [27] . Specifically, they consider an auditing policy that prevents revealing the intersection if its size exceeds some threshold. We could think of the resulting protocol as a complement of t-PSI defined in this paper. Their experimental results (the Sort-Compare-Shuffle protocol, but not the Bitwise-AND protocol which is only practical for a small universe) show that such additional computation does not incur measurable performance over their plain PSI. Anyhow, the complexity of garbled circuit based t-PSI like protocol is O(n log n) to the best of our knowledge. On the contrary, one of our constructions achieves linear complexity (at the cost of leaking the size of the intersection). Experiments [17] showed that garbled circuit based PSI protocols can be slower than customized protocols. Moreover, all their constructions are only secure in the semi-honest model, while one of ours is secure in the malicious model.
Constructing t-PSI based on other techniques with better efficiency is non-trivial. To the best of our knowledge, the literature has no such protocol, not to say access structure more general than threshold policy, e.g., weighted threshold, in which different elements carry different weights counting towards the final threshold.
Apart from the technical challenge, we think that t-PSI is a useful primitive that deserves investigation. The threshold version of existing cryptosystems, e.g., signature [45] , encryption [15] , password-based authenticated key exchange [35, 43] , etc. have found various applications. We foresee the same will hold for t-PSI.
Technical Overview of Our Results
We propose the notion of secret transfer with access structure (STAS). STAS transfers a secret only to those who satisfy the access structure prescribed by the secret owner, with the aim of revealing as little information about the access structure as possible. STAS is a generalization of threshold PSI. To see, the secret is the intersection of two private sets. The access structure is a threshold policy on the two sets, i.e., the intersection set is only revealed if its size is larger than a threshold.
We focus on threshold secret transfer (TST), as a special instance of STAS. TST allows a server to transfer a secret κ to a client if and only if their respective sets have more than t common elements. We formulate the security definitions for this new primitive, and provide two constructions based on either oblivious polynomial evaluation (OPE) [19] , or a variant of garbled Bloom filter (GBF) [17] . OPE and GBF have been used to build state-of-art (vanilla) PSI protocols. For building TST, we introduce oblivious transfer for a sparse array (OTSA), in which the selection strings are from a large domain. This helps us to achieve fine-grained access control in private matching. Typical OT only works on an array indexed by polynomially many numbers.
We first show how to build t-PSI-CA, a variant of t-PSI, which allows the client to learn the size of the intersection |C ∩ S|. This suffices for some scenarios and can also serve as a feature (see Sec. 8) . We propose two solutions that remove such leakage in the full version.
With TST, t-PSI-CA is readily achievable. The server and the client engage in a TST with their respective sets. The client will obtain a secret κ only if there are more than t overlapping elements. Conceptually κ plays the role of a "proof token" to show that the client indeed holds a set containing at least t common elements. We stress that which elements belong to the set remains hidden at this point. To transfer the set, the server appends κ to every element in its set S, and executes another PSI with the client using this new set.
Our construction blueprint is readily extensible to other access structures by replacing the polynomialbased threshold secret sharing with other schemes. For example, we can obtain secret transfer for weighted threshold and weighted t-PSI-CA. We also discuss how to construct STAS by replacing threshold secret sharing with linear secret sharing (LSSS) (see Def. 1), which supports more expressive access control policy. Figure 1 summarizes the roadmap of our constructions.
Our primary focus is to propose efficient protocols which are in the semi-honest (or honest-but-curious) model, in which the adversary follows the protocol exactly as specified, but may try to learn as much as possible about the input of the other party. Semi-honest constructions are often more efficient than their fully secure counterparts. Nevertheless, we also propose one construction that is secure in the malicious model.
We summarize our main contributions as follows: 1. We formally define oblivious transfer for a sparse array (OTSA), and provide two constructions by integrating existing techniques for private setintersection in a novel manner. The first construction is conceptually simple and we show how to extend it to be secure in the malicious model. The second one is more efficient with linear computation and communication cost in the size of the array. 2. We formalize a new cryptographic primitive called secret transfer with access structure (STAS). A notable special case of STAS is threshold secret transfer (TST). We provide a construction of STAS from OTSA and secret sharing. We also elaborate the applications of this new primitive. 3. We (for the first time) formalized the notion of threshold private set-intersection (t-PSI) and its weaker variant t-PSI-CA. We provide an efficient generic transform from TST and PSI to t-PSI-CA in the semi-honest model. Both the definition and construction can be easily extended to a more expressive access structure by replacing TST with STAS. 4. We proposed two ways to achieve t-PSI. 5. We implement the second OTSA construction and evaluate its performance. The result shows that it is practical for array size expected by our applications.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses primitives related to TST including PSI. Sec. 3 introduces notations and important building blocks of our protocol. In Sec. 4, we introduce OTSA, which may be of independent interests. We then define TST and construct TST from OTSA in Sec. 5. Sec. 6 presents our generic construction of t-PSI-CA. We provide evaluation results in Sec. 7. Finally, we conclude with further applications and future work. Table 1 lists the acronyms of the major primitives.
OTSA + threshold secret sharing −→ TST 
Related Work

Private Set Intersections
The first rigorous treatment for PSI was done by Freedman et al. [19] , who proposed a protocol based on oblivious polynomial evaluation (OPE). The key idea is that the client uses additive homomorphic encryption to encrypt the coefficients of a polynomial p(x) whose roots are the elements in the set. The server obliviously evaluates the polynomial rp(x) + x for each element s i ∈ S. The client can then decrypt the evaluation results from the server and compare those with its own set. Using similar technique, Kissner and Song [31] proposed multiparty PSI protocol. PSI protocols in the malicious model using this technique are also proposed [13, 22, 24] . Another tool for constructing PSI is oblivious pseudorandom function (OPRF) [18, 23, 28] . The server sends to the client f k (s i ) for all s i ∈ S, where f (·) is a pseudorandom function and k is a random secret key. The client and the server then engage in an OPRF protocol such that the client learns f k (c i ) for each c i ∈ C while the server learns nothing. PSI protocols based on OPRF achieve linear time and space complexities.
Recently, Dong et al. [17] introduced new techniques for PSI. The core component is a variant of Bloom Filter, which they called garbled Bloom filter (GBF), to be described in the next section. With oblivious transfer (OT), they constructed very efficient PSI protocols in both the semi-honest and malicious models. Inspired by their work, we construct PSI with access structure with linear complexity in the semi-honest model.
Researchers have considered variants of PSI. PSI-CA reveals only the size (cardinality) of intersection but not the set itself [2, 19, 26, 31] . Camenisch and Zaverucha [10] and De Cristofaro et al. [11, 12] considered authorized PSI which requires a trusted party to authorize the input sets by signing on them. Ateniese et al. [3] and D'Arco et al. [14] proposed size-hiding PSI which hides the size of the input sets. Outsourcing the computation of PSI to an oblivious cloud is considered by Abadi et al. [1] and Kerschbaum [30] .
Fuzzy variants of PSI are studied in the literature as well. Freedman et al. [19] considered fuzzy PSI where an element is considered to be in another set if this set contains a "similar" element. Kissner and Song [31] considered threshold set union and its variants in a multiuser setting: all n players learn which elements appear more than t times in the union (which is a multiset) of their private input sets. Both notions are different from t-PSI.
Fuzzy Vault
A fuzzy vault [29] allows a server to "lock" a small secret κ using a set S, such that a client holding another set C can recover κ efficiently if C is similar to S. It looks like TST, but we highlight the differences here.
We first briefly recall the existing construction [29] : the elements in set S are encoded as distinct xcoordinates. The server selects a random polynomial p(·) that encodes κ (say p(0) = κ), and evaluates p(·) on these coordinates. To hide κ, the server adds a number of random "noisy" points that do not lie on p(·), and publishes the set of both real and noisy points in clear as the vault.
If the client holds a set C that substantially overlaps with S, it can identify enough common elements via x-coordinates to reconstruct (the polynomial and) κ. If the intersection is not large enough, the client is unable to identify enough "correct" x-coordinates to perform polynomial interpolation. However, an adversary can still try to reconstruct κ via trial-and-error. The success probability of this attack is non-negligible unless an exponential number of noisy points are added.
In TST, we aim at imposing a sharp distinction between "over threshold" and "below threshold". The client only knows |C ∩ S| if it is less than the threshold, but not exactly which elements in C lie in the intersection. This is not easily achievable by fuzzy vault.
Attribute-Based Encryption
Attribute-based encryption (ABE) allows sharing of encrypted content to people according to some prescribed access control policy. Anyone in possession of attributes satisfying the access policy can use their secret keys for decryption. Early ABE schemes reveal the access policy of ciphertexts to everyone, which might be sensitive. Anonymous ABE [33, 39] is then proposed.
One might attempt to implement STAS by encrypting the secret value using anonymous ABE. Yet, ABE requires a trusted authority to set up the whole system and issue secret keys to participants according to their attributes. Such requirement somewhat trivializes the two-party computation since both parties need to trust the authority not to reveal the attributes to others.
Furthermore, the anonymity and/or functionality offered by practical anonymous ABE schemes nowadays are not ideal. For example, the size of public key and ciphertext in the first anonymous ABE scheme [39] are both linear in the size of the attribute domain U, and it only supports limited form of policies. The scheme of Lai et al. [33] supports linear secret sharing scheme (LSSS) (see Def. 1) based policy, yet they sacrifice anonymity to some extent. Each attribute is a categoryvalue (e.g. Title: Professor, Department: CS) pair in their construction. The LSSS matrix is defined over the categories which is public. Only the attribute values are anonymized. That is to say, a policy "(Title: Professor) AND (Department: CS)" is anonymized as "(Title: * ) AND (Department: * )". In contrast, such an access policy is anonymized as "A AND B" in our STAS construction where A and B are predicates. To conclude, existing anonymous ABE is not a good fit.
Preliminary
Notations
For a bit-string x, |x| denotes its length. The i th bit of x is
For a finite set S, |S| denotes its size and s $ ← − S denotes picking an element uniformly at random from S.
We write {s i } n as a shorthand for the set S = {s 1 , . . . , s n } of n elements. We drop the subscript n if it is clear from context. The security parameter is λ ∈ N and its unary representation is 1 λ .
Algorithms are probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) unless otherwise stated. By y ← A(x 1 , . . . ; R), we run algorithm A on input x 1 , . . . using randomness R, and assign the output to y. For brevity we may omit R.
A probability ensemble indexed by I is a sequence of random variables indexed by a countable index set I, namely, X = {X i } i∈I where X i is a random variable. Two distribution ensembles X = {X n } and Y = {Y n } are computationally indistinguishable, denoted by X c ≡ Y , if for every PPT algorithm D, there exists a negligible function negl(·) such that for every n ∈ N,
Secret Sharing
Threshold secret sharing is a fundamental cryptographic primitive and it could be considered as the most basic tool for threshold cryptography. It allows a dealer to split a secret κ into n shares, such that κ can be recovered efficiently with any subset of t or more shares. Any subset of size less than t reveals no information about the secret value. Shamir secret-sharing scheme [44] , which is based on polynomial interpolation, is such a (t, n)-secret sharing scheme. We denote SecretSharing (t,n) (κ) and Reconstruct (t,n) ({κ i } n ) as its sharing algorithm and reconstruction algorithm. When t = n, an efficient (n, n)-secret sharing scheme can be obtained from ⊕ (XOR) operations.It works by picking random |κ|-bit strings κ 1 , κ 2 , . . . , κ n−1 as the first n − 1 shares. The last share is given by κ n = n−1 i=1 κ i ⊕ κ. We will use this scheme extensively.
Linear Secret-Sharing Schemes
We can extend threshold secret sharing scheme to support more general access structure. Let {κ 1 , . . . , κ n } be a set of secret shares. A collection A ⊆ 2 {κ1,...,κn} is monotone when ∀B, C: if B ∈ A and B ⊆ C then C ∈ A. An access structure [4] (resp. monotonic access structure) is a collection (resp. monotone collection) A of non-empty subsets of {κ 1 , . . . , κ n }, i.e., A ⊆ 2 {κ1,...,κn} \ {∅}. We use SecretSharing A (κ) and Reconstruct A ({κ i } n ) to denote the sharing algorithm and reconstruction algorithm in a secret sharing scheme implementing access structure A. Any monotone access structure can be realized by a linear secret sharing scheme defined below [4] . Any LSSS defined as above enjoys the linear reconstruction property as follows. Suppose that Π is an LSSS for access structure A. Let S ∈ A be an authorized set, and I ⊆ {1, . . . , } be defined as I = {i : ρ(i) ∈ S}. There exist constants {w i ∈ Z p } i∈I satisfying i∈I w i M i = (1, 0, . . . , 0), so that if {λ i } are valid shares of any secret κ according to Π, i∈I w i λ i = κ. Furthermore, these constants {w i } can be found in time polynomial in the size of the share-generating matrix M . For any unauthorized set, no such constants exist. The LSSS is denoted by (M, ρ), and its size is the number of rows of M .
Definition 1 (Linear Secret-sharing Schemes (LSSS)
Access structures can also be represented by monotonic boolean formulas. The techniques of transforming any monotonic boolean formula to LSSS are well known in the literature [4] . One can also convert the boolean formula into an access tree. An access tree of nodes results in an LSSS matrix of rows. Readers can refer to [34, appendix] for the conversion algorithm.
Oblivious Transfer
Oblivious transfer (OT) is another basic cryptographic building block. It allows the receiver to get only part of the sender input, while the sender remains oblivious about what the receiver obtains. Formally, in an OT m protocol, the sender inputs m pairs -bit strings
At the end of the protocol, the sender learns nothing about b, while the receiver only gets x i,bi for 1 ≤ i ≤ m. OT protocols in the random oracle model can be very efficient.
The above formulation only allows the receiver to choose 1-out-of-2 according to each bit in the selection string. In k-out-of-n OT, the receiver only gets k of n strings from the sender by specifying a set of distinct indexes (in the range
We use the notion (which slightly abuses the one defined above) OT 
Additive Homomorphic Encryption
We will also use a CPA-secure additive homomorphic encryption scheme. One well known example is Paillier cryptosystem [40] . It supports addition, and multiplication by a constant, without private key sk: (1) given two ciphertexts Enc pk (m 0 ) and Enc pk (m 1 ), there is an efficient operation computing Enc pk (m 0 +m 1 ); (2) given one ciphertext Enc pk (m) and a constant c, there is an efficient operation computing Enc pk (c·m). A corollary of these two properties is: given encryptions of the coefficients a 0 , . . . , a k of a polynomial p(x), and a plaintext s, it is possible to compute an encryption of p(s).
Oblivious (Permuted) PRF
An oblivious pseudorandom function [18] is a two-party protocol between a server S and a client C for securely computing a pseudorandom function f k (·) under key k known by S only, while the input x is known by only C. The client learns f k (x) while the server learns nothing after their interaction. In this work, we consider the construction given by Jarecki and Liu [28] . It is secure under parallel composition [28] and our second construction relies on this special property. This protocol uses Camenisch-Shoup version [9] of Paillier encryption [40] (Enc pk (·), Dec sk (·)), which is additive homomorphic, to compute Dodis-Yampolskiy PRF [16] 
We sketch the main procedures as follows: 1. The server sends Enc pks (k) to the client. The parallel version of this OPRF can be easily obtained by replacing r c , r s , (c 1 , c 2 ), and (s 1 , s 2 ) with
2 )} |C| , and {(s
2 )} |C| respectively in Steps 2 to 4. Also note that if the server applies a random permutation Π on {(s
2 )} |S| , the client will still get the same set g 1/(k+xi) |C| , but it does not know which g 1 k+x i corresponds to which x i . We denote such parallel OPRF with extra permutation as oblivious permuted pseudorandom function (OPPRF).
(Garbled) Bloom Filters
is a compact array of m bits that represents a set S of at most n elements for efficient set membership testing. It consists of a set of k independent hash functions H = (h 1 , . . . , h k ) where h i uniformly maps elements to index numbers in [1, m] .
All bits in the array are initialized to 0. To insert an element x ∈ S, x is hashed by the k hash functions to get k index numbers. The bits at all these indexes in the array are set to 1, regardless of its original value. To check if an item y is in S, y is hashed by the k hash functions to get k indexes. If any of the bits at these indexes is 0, we conclude that y is certainly not in S. Otherwise, y is probably in S. So, it never yields a false negative, but there is a small fraction of false positives. The upper bound of the false positive probability [6] is:
If we set the false positive rate to be less than a threshold 0 , it can be shown that the length of the bit array size m should be at least m ≥ n log 2 e · log 2 1/ 0 , where e is the base of the natural logarithm. Equality is achieved when the number of hash functions k = (m/n)· ln 2 = log 2 1/ 0 . The rest of the paper will stick with these optimal values when we use (garbled) Bloom filter. Specifically, we set the false positive probability to = 2 −λ where λ is the security parameter. As a result, m = λn log 2 and k = λ in all cases. We represent a Bloom filter with optimal parameters as an (n,
is a variant of Bloom filter that enables efficient PSI. Roughly speaking, a garbled Bloom filter uses an array of λ-bit strings instead of an array of bits in a normal Bloom filter. Initially all m strings in the garbled Bloom filter are set to NULL. To insert an element x ∈ {0, 1} λ , x is first split into k shares by XOR-based (k, k)-secret sharing. The i th share is placed at location h i (x). If the location h i (x) is already occupied due to previous insertion, we reuse the string at that location, and adjust the value of subsequent shares accordingly, subject to the constraint that
Such adjust-ment is always possible unless all locations {h i (x)} 1≤i≤k are all occupied, which corresponds to a false positive. The probability of this happening can be negligible if the parameters are set properly. After inserting all elements in S to GBF, the undefined slots are filled with random strings. To check if an item y is in S, y is hashed by the k hash functions, and the strings in those locations are retrieved. If y can be reconstructed from these shares, we conclude that y is surely in S. For brevity, GBF with optimal parameters will be denoted by (n, H, λ)-GBF.
Zero-knowledge Proof of Knowledge
Zero-knowledge proof system, introduced by Goldwasser et al. [21] , enables a prover to convince a verifier that some statement is true, without conveying any other information apart from such mere fact since the verifier can simulate the communication transcript. We use ZKPoK{a|φ(a)} to denote a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge of value a that satisfies a publicly computable relation φ, where a can be extracted when given the trapdoor for the common reference string.
OT for a Sparse Array
We propose oblivious transfer for a sparse array (OTSA) as a building block for secret transfer with access structure (STAS). We first provide a formal definition for OTSA and then sketch the main design idea before presenting two concrete constructions.
Although in an abstract level, the two constructions both make use of the idea of PSI with data transfer, we believe the first OPE-based construction is conceptually simpler and easier to understand than the second GBFbased one for readers who do not have prior knowledge in recent advances of PSI, in particular, (garbled) Bloom filter. Moreover, at the end of this section, we will elaborate how to extend this construction to accommodate malicious adversaries. As a consequence, the OPE-based one is worth mentioning, even though its computation complexity is quite high (quadratic in the number of elements). The second construction achieves linear complexity using recent technique, i.e., combining GBF and OT. In Sec. 7, we implement the second (more practical) construction and evaluate its performance.
Definitions
OTSA is a new variant of the original OT concept. The sender holds an array of n s elements {e i } 1≤i≤ns (from a certain domain), which are associated with n s distinct indices I s = {s 1 , . . . , s ns }, where each s j for 1 ≤ j ≤ n s is an element from the domain D, not necessarily [1, n s ]. The receiver specifies a set of indices I r = {r 1 , . . . , r nr }, not necessarily a subset of I s , and asks for retrieving the associated elements. We assume the domain D is large, i.e., n s |D| and n r |D|, so not every index r j ∈ I r specified by the receiver indeed has an element from the sender associated with it. Our OTSA satisfies the following properties: -Correctness: The receiver retrieves E = {e j } 1≤j≤nr , where e j = e j if s j ∈ I s ∩ I r , or e j is an element randomly picked from a pre-defined More on Correctness Requirement. For OTSA to be useful, the receiver should have the ability to differentiate a correct data element from a random string. In case the application (e.g., in TST) may not make it apparent, it can be achieved by asking the sender to append a special symbol to e i for recognition, or publish {H(e i )} where H(·) is a one-way hash function.
On Sender Indices Privacy. When a correct data element is distinguishable from a random string, the receiver can learn the cardinality of the intersection, i.e., |I s ∩ I r |, according to the functionality requirement. We stress that OTSA itself does not leak such information. Even if the cardinality is revealed from auxiliary information like {H(e i )}, the receiver will not know what exactly the intersection set I s ∩ I r is. This level of privacy suffices for our applications in Sec. 8.
Security
Using the language of secure two-party computation, we define OTSA as the following functionality:
Definition 2 (Oblivious Transfer for a Sparse Array).
OTSA is a two-party computation protocol that implements the following functionality
where the input of server We assume that the size of index sets, namely n s and n r , are publicly known by both parties. We say that a protocol π is an OTSA if it securely implements the above function f . As discussed in Sec. 3.4, we denote such a protocol by OT 
Construction Idea
Our two constructions borrow ideas from the PSI literature. One is based on oblivious polynomial evaluation (OPE); the other one is based on a variant of garbled Bloom filter. It has been observed that the PSI protocol from OPE can actually allow the transfer of auxiliary information. Hence, we exploit this storage capacity to store the data elements for our OTSA. Corresponding, we make the same observation for the GBF-based PSI. We note that while both PSI protocols share the same property, their construction ideas are quite different.
OPE-based OT
|I s ∩I r | I r Now we describe our first construction, which is based on oblivious polynomial evaluation, in Figure 2 .
The correctness of this construction is straightforward: if s i ∈ I r ∩ I s , then rp(s i ) + e i = e i , meaning that the receiver successfully received one element; otherwise rp(s i ) + e i will be a random string containing no useProtocol: OPE-based OT Enc pk (rp(s i ) + e i ). 5. The sender sends a random permutation of these n s ciphertexts to the receiver. 6. The receiver decrypts all n s ciphertexts received, picks up the set of valid elements. Proof. We consider two corruption cases.
Simulating the view of the sender using Sim s . This case is easy, since the view of the sender only contains pk and {Enc pk (a i )}. Sim s can generate the first one using the KeyGen algorithm, while the second one can be simulated by encryption of zeros due to the CPA-security of the encryption scheme. Assume for contradiction, there exists a distinguisher D for the simulated view and the real view. One can build a distinguisher D breaking the CPA-security of the encryption scheme (KeyGen, Enc, Dec). In the CPA-security game, Simulating the view of the receiver using Sim r . It is easy to simulate this view because the receiver only sees either encryptions of random elements in the message space, or encryptions of a subset of server elements E . In more details, Sim r is given as input I r = {r 1 , . . . , r nr } and E . It invokes a copy of the (semihonest) receiver internally using I r as input, while playing the role of the honest sender. Sim r first gets the public key pk from the receiver, and a vector of ciphertexts encrypting the coefficients of a polynomial constructed from I r . Sim r outputs the simulated view as a permutation of the following set of ciphertexts: (1) for |E | of them, each encrypts e j ∈ E , (2) for the rest |I s | − |E | of them, just encrypts random messages. We claim that the simulated view and the real view are statistically close. The only potential difference is that in the simulated view, the receiver sees |I s | − |E | random messages while in the real view, it sees encryptions of rp(s i ) + e i for s i ∈ I s \ I r , e i ∈ E \ E , where r is a fresh random element for each i. Due to the fresh randomness r and the requirement that the message space is super-polynomial in the security parameter, these two distributions are thus statistically close.
Extending to the Malicious Model
One may expect that techniques in constructing malicious model PSI protocols [19, 22, 24] can be adapted for our setting to construct a malicious model OT |Is∩Ir| Ir . Although this is true for simulating the case against a malicious client, we encounter some immediate difficulties when simulating in the face of a malicious server.
Recall that the major technique [19, 24] is to derandomizing computation for elements in the intersection. To make sure the server follows the protocol execution, the server needs to compute encryptions of rp(s i ) +r, wherer is chosen at random, and the randomness in the encryption algorithm is derived deterministically from H(r). (Specifically, H(·) can be a PRF [24] or may be modelled as a random oracle in some security proof [19] ). After decryption, the client receives a set {r}, and then for eachr repeats the encryption process for every element c i in the client set. Because computation can be repeated at the client side deterministically, the server does not have the freedom to cheat. If we adapt it for our setting, it will violate sender indices privacy because I r ∩ I s is revealed in trial encryption. Similar obstacle appears when using techniques from a recent work of Hazay [22] .
To solve this problem, we turn to the common reference string (CRS) model and use zero-knowledge proofs systems. We require a CRS containing a public key pk of a CPA-secure public key encryption scheme, whose distribution is the same as if it is generated through KeyGen algorithm, but no party knows the corresponding secret key sk. At the beginning, the sender encrypts its index-data pair (s i , e i ) under this public key pk and sends a permutation of such pairs to the receiver. The receiver and the sender continue the original protocol execution except that when the sender returns c i = Enc pk (rp(s i )+e i ), it also prepares a zero-knowledge proof proving the knowledge of r, s i , e i such that c i can be computed from Enc pk (r), Enc pk (s i ), Enc pk (e i ), and the encrypted polynomial {Enc pk (a i )}. The same proof also shows that s i , e i are the plaintext of some ciphertext under public key pk sent previously. Figure 3 descries our protocol in detail. 
GBF
* -based OT
Our second construction is based on a variant of garbled Bloom filter (GBF), which we call it secret embedding GBF * . An (n, H, λ)-secret embedding GBF * X,I stores a secret set X based on another index set I of the same size n. In the original GBF, each element x j ∈ X is first split into k = λ shares, these shares are then placed at locations h 1 (x j ), . . . , h k (x j ). While in our GBF * X,I , specifically, the boxed line in BuildGBF * (Algorithm 1) in Appendix B, each x j ∈ X is split and placed at locations defined by h 1 (i j ), . . . , h k (i j ), where i j ∈ I. Namely, the set I "indexes" the locations to place X.
Protocol: OPE-based OT
|Is∩Ir| Ir in the malicious model Input: The receiver input is an index set I r = {r 1 , . . . , r nr }. The sender input is an index set I s = {s 1 , . . . , s ns } and a data set E = {e 1 , . . . , e ns }. Common reference string: a public key pk of a CPA-secure public-key encryption scheme ( Enc, Dec). 1. The sender commits to its input I s and E by computing {(s i ,ẽ i )} = {(Enc pk (s i ), Enc pk (e i ))}, and sends a permutation of these pairs to the receiver. 2. The receiver chooses a key pair (pk, sk) for a CPA-secure additive homomorphic encryption scheme (Enc pk , Dec sk ), and publishes pk. 3. The receiver computes the coefficients of the polynomial p(x) = nr i=0 a i x i of degree n r with roots being elements in the selection strings set I r . 4. The receiver encrypts each of the (n r + 1) coefficients by Enc pk and gives the sender the resulting set of ciphertexts, {â i = Enc pk (a i )}, and the following zero-knowledge proof of knowledge: 
6. The sender sends a random permutation of these n s ciphertexts together with the ZKPoK 2 to the receiver. 7. The receiver verifies the proofs. If all the proofs pass then it decrypts all n s ciphertexts received, and picks up the set of valid elements. Otherwise it aborts. When we query GBF * X,I using some element i ∈ I in QueryGBF * , GBF * X,I returns the corresponding element x . If i / ∈ I, it returns a uniformly random string. The GBF * Intersection algorithm takes as input a GBF * X,I and a BF I , then outputs GBF *
X,I∩I
. The BuildGBF * , QueryGBF * , and GBF * Intersection algorithms of GBF * as well as the related theorems are listed in Appendix B. Figure 4 details the procedure of our second OT |Is∩Ir| Ir construction. In the second step, the set I r of the receiver is transformed into a pseudorandom set I r . We implement this transformation using an OPPRF protocol (Sec. 3.6) instead of a normal OPRF because we need to hide the one-to-one correspondence between r j and r j from the receiver. Any secure OPPRF suffices, so our design is modular. , which we highlight the differences here. The simulator needs to randomly generate a set of indicesĨ of size |I s ∩ I r |, and uses it as the additional input to construct GBF * π
E,Ĩ
. This is computationally indistinguishable from GBF * E,I r ∩I s by the security of PRF. Thus, by Theorem 9 in Appendix B, it is also indistinguishable from GBF * π E,I s ∩I r .
(Threshold) Secret Transfer
We now discuss how to make use of OTSA to construct secret transfer with access structure (STAS). For illustration, we first define STAS with a simple threshold access structure. We call it threshold secret transfer (TST). Next we demonstrate how to easily extend TST to support general access structure, namely STAS. 
Definition
Definition 3 (Threshold secret transfer (TST)). TST is a two-party computation protocol that implements f :
where (κ, S) and C are the inputs of server and client.
This definition always leaks the intersection size to the client. It is due to the technical difficulty of simulating to the client without this knowledge, which we will discuss in more details later. For the sake of completeness, we give the stronger definition called strong threshold secret transfer ((ST) 2 ) in Appendix C, and provide two candidate (ST) 2 constructions in the full version.
TST Construction from OT
|I s ∩I r | I r
The basic idea behind the construction is to split κ into {κ i } using a (t, |S|)-secret sharing scheme. The server and the client then engage in an OT |Is∩Ir| Ir protocol with the server acting as the sender using secret input set K and indexing set S, and the client acting as the receiver using C as the input set. By the security of OT |Is∩Ir| Ir , the client receives only a subset of secret shares of κ corresponding to elements in |C ∩ S|. The security of TST naturally follows from that of (t, |S|)-secret sharing. 
Proof. If OT
|Is∩Ir| Ir is secure, the simulators for both sides exist. We can use them as subroutines to construct the simulator for the whole protocol.
Server: We construct a simulator Sim S , when given the private input and output of the server, simulates its view View S of a real protocol execution. View S contains the input set S, the secret value κ, the random coins, and the view of OT This time Sim C selects a random κ , and computes
OT rx (C, (K , |K|))) as the simulated view. To see that the above simulation works well, notice that by the security of the (t, n s )-secret sharing scheme, bothK generated by Sim C andK received in the real protocol execution leak no information about the original value κ and κ respectively. ThusK andK are computationally indistinguishable. Therefore Sim OT rx (C, (K , |K|)) simulates the view of OT |Is∩Ir| Ir perfectly.
In both cases, the view of the client can be simulated. With the simulation for the server, we conclude that the protocol in Fig. 5 is secure in the semi-honest model.
Extending to the Malicious Model
Note that the above proof only asserts that the construction in Figure 5 is secure in the semi-honest model. Here we sketch how to obtain TST in the malicious model using the construction presented in Figure 3 (in the common reference string model) as an example. Firstly, we would need to have the sender commits to the secret value κ at the beginning of the protocol together with OT |Is∩Ir| Ir input (K, S). Moreover, the sender has to prepare a zero-knowledge proof showing that K is indeed the result of secret sharing κ. By doing so, we are assured that a malicious server cannot place invalid secret sharesK without being caught.
Transferring Multiple Secrets
Our exposition only considers transferring the secret shares of a single secret. Yet, it is possible to store multiple shares of the same secret in the same slot for supporting weighted TST. One step further, it is also possible to store multiple shares of different secrets in the same slots. However, since the capacity of each slot is limited. One may need to resort to a hybrid approach, such that the TST stores symmetric keys which can in turn decrypt the ciphertexts of multiple shares.
Extending to General Access Structure
The threshold access structure of TST directly comes from the underlying threshold secret sharing scheme (SecretSharing (t,ns) , Reconstruct (t,n) ). By replacing it with another scheme with different access structure (SecretSharing A , Reconstruct A ), the TST construction readily transforms into STAS with access structure. The proof strategy remains mostly unchanged. In particular, linear secret sharing (LSSS) [4] (see Def. 1) fits with our design well. We do not need the usual mapping ρ from attributes to row number of the matrix, since our OTSA supports a sparse array with indices from a large domain.
Recall that in LSSS, the share generating matrix M is public. The secret value κ is embedded in a column vector v = (κ, r 2 , . . . , r n ), and party ρ(x) gets the share (M v) x . In STAS, the server also needs to publish M . Moreover, it explicitly appends an index x to each share (M v) x , so that the client knows how to calculate constants {w i ∈ Z p } i∈|Is∩Ir| according to M in the reconstruction phase. Exposing M in clear reveals some information about the access structure, e.g., the shape of the corresponding access tree. However, we would like to stress that by the security property (sender indices privacy) of the underlying OTSA, the client does not know the correspondence between the elements in its secret set C and the leaf nodes of the access tree.
Discussion on Intersection Size
From a theoretical point of view, knowing both C and |C ∩ S| allows one to infer some information about S, especially when |C| ≈ |C ∩ S|. For instance, if |C| = 100 and the client learns that |C ∩ S| = 70, it can conclude that many elements in C are also in S. Moreover, if the client can interact with the server multiple times, it can change C by one element each time and monitor how |C ∩ S| changes accordingly, which eventually lead to S.
From a practical standpoint, such leakage is acceptable because the aforementioned probing attack can be mitigated by limiting the number of interactions. Moreover, in the next section we will see an immediate application of TST (resp. STAS), i.e., a generic t-PSI-CA (resp. PSI with access structure) construction from TST (resp. STAS). The fact that TST always leaks the cardinality of intersection hinders us from obtaining t-PSI. Nevertheless, we believe t-PSI-CA is still a useful primitive and it is the first of its kind in the literature. Finally, we remark that, when the cardinality of the intersection is not exceeding the threshold, t-PSI-CA is the same as PSI-CA; otherwise t-PSI-CA works as a normal PSI.
6 Threshold-PSI-CA Protocol
Definitions
Definition 4 (Threshold Private Set-Intersection). t-PSI is a two-party computation protocol that implements the following functionality
where the server input is S and the client input is C.
Definition 5 (t-PSI-Cardinality). t-PSI-CA is a twoparty computation protocol that implements the following functionality
We assume t is known by the client beforehand.
Generic t-PSI-CA from TST
With all the building blocks at hand, we are now ready to build t-PSI(-CA) in a simple manner. The client and the server first engage in a TST protocol, such that the client learns κ if |C∩S| ≥ t; then they engage in a normal Protocol: t-PSI-CA Input: (Client) C = {c i } nc / (Server) S = {s i } ns . 1. The server randomly picks κ from {0, 1} λ . 2. The client and the server engage in a secure TST protocol π TST with the server input being (κ, S) and the client input being C. 3. The server computes S κ = {s i ||κ} ns . 4. If the client obtains κ from π TST , it computes C κ = {c i ||κ} nc . Otherwise it randomly samples κ , and computes C κ as {c i ||κ } nc . 5. The client and the server engage in a secure PSI protocol π PSI with the server input being S κ and the client input being C κ .
Fig. 6. Protocol: t-PSI-CA
PSI protocol, in which the server and the client uses S κ = {s i ||κ} ns and C κ = {c i ||κ} nc as input respectively. In case |C ∩ S| < t, the client chooses a random κ uniformly at random and use C κ = {c i ||κ } nc instead. The correctness of the above idea is straightforward. What we need to prove is its security. To this end, we first formally describe the above construction in Fig. 6 . Proof. If π TST and π PSI are secure, there exist simulators for the participants in both protocols. We can use them as subroutines to construct our simulators. Server: The view of a real protocol execution contains the input set S, the random coins, the view of π TST , the view of π PSI (View S = (S, r s , View π TST svr , View π PSI svr )). Given S, the simulator Sim S picks coins r s uniformly at random, chooses κ uniformly at random from {0, 1} λ , computes S κ = {s i ||κ} ns . Sim S then invokes the simulator for the underlying protocols to obtain Sim -If |C ∩ S| ≥ t, the simulator Sim C is given C and C ∩ S as input. Sim C selects κ from {0, 1} λ and coins r c uniformly at random, and computes C κ and C κ ∩ S κ accordingly. Sim C invokes the simulator for π PSI and π TST to obtain respectively the simulated views Sim
as the simulated view. Because κ is identically distributed as κ (which is selected uniformly at random by the server in the real protocol), Sim
. By the security of π PSI and π TST , the simulated view is computationally indistinguishable from the real one.
-If |C ∩ S| < t, Sim C is the same as above except replacing Sim
In every case, the view can be simulated. Thus the protocol in Fig. 6 is secure in the semi-honest model.
PSI with Access Structure
Sec. 5.5 shows how to construct STAS by replacing threshold secret sharing in TST with a linear secret sharing scheme. Following the same vein, we obtain PSI with expressive access structure easily by replacing threshold secret sharing in t-PSI-CA with linear secret sharing. The largely repetitive construction is omitted.
Evaluation
Both the computational cost and communication cost of GBF * are linear in n = |I s |, while the OPE-based one is quadratic. We thus only implemented 1 the GBF * -based OT |Is∩Ir| Ir in C, and evaluated its performance. The major modification we did is adding OPPRF before GBF related operations. We use existing Paillier encryption implementation 2 for OPPRF. We consider |I r | = n here. The major bottleneck of our GBF * -based OT |Is∩Ir| Ir is Paillier encryption, decryption, and computing Enc pk (c · m) in OPPRF. For a naïve implementation of OPPRF with n elements, the client needs to encrypt n elements in its set X, together with n random number r c . The server also needs to encrypt n random elements r s . However, these values do not depend on the input of the other party, so both the client and the server can precompute these values before starting the whole protocol. Our implementation exploits this observation. When a more efficient OPPRF is available, the efficiency of our protocol will be improved correspondingly.
We first fix the key length for Paillier encryption to be 1024-bit, and the security of GBF * to 80-bit, per NIST suggestion 3 that factorization-based cryptography with 1024-bit key length has 80-bit security. We vary the set size n to be 64, 128, 256, 512, 1024, 2048, and measure the execution time of GBF * -based OT |Is∩Ir| Ir construction. We follow the approach of [17] to use randomly generated sets to conduct evaluation. For a higher level of security, we fix Paillier key length to 3072-bit and the security of GBF * to 128-bit. The result is shown in Table 2 and Figure 7 , where all the reported execution times are the average running time of 5 independent executions. We can see that the computation time increases linearly with the set size. When the access structure is simple, e.g., the set size is < 20, OT |Is∩Ir| Ir terminates around half a second at 80-bit security. At 128-bit security, the protocol finishes in a few seconds.
Further Applications
Private Matchmaking
In dating apps, users are mostly strangers to each other. They may not want to reveal their (potentially sensitive) attributes to any other users. On the other hand, two users are willing to share information when a "match" is found, i.e., when they share a lot of attributes in common. TST, or STAS, supports privacy-preserving matchmaking in a straightforward manner.
In more details, the attribute set is treated as input to TST or STAS. User Alice chooses a random secret value κ such that another user Bob can learn κ only if his attribute set overlaps with that of Alice to a certain degree specified by Alice. (In case of STAS, the attribute set of Bob must satisfy the policy specified by Alice.) Such a secret value serves as an access control token for further interaction between Alice and Bob.
A nice observation here is that, the asymmetry in the roles of the client and the server in our protocol may actually be useful in the context of private matchmaking. For example, a business model of paying user (client) and free user (server) may be employed since the client will know if there is a match and hence has the choice to contact the other party (server) upon receipt of the secret κ (which can be the profile picture).
Moreover, even if the threshold is not reached, the users may know to what extent they are similar, which can be a useful feature allowing the users to adjust their expected similarity level for future matching.
It is also possible to store the shares of multiple secrets corresponding to different policies through a single invocation of our protocol. For example, a requester who satisfies only the gender criteria can get an ((1, 1) share of) pseudonym with a (1, 2) share of a real name. When another criteria is satisfied, the corresponding slot will contain only the other (1, 2) share of the real name. This gives great flexibility for matchmaking apps.
Our current non-optimized construction of TST shows reasonable performance. A dating site eHarmony uses a questionnaire consisting of 258 questions requiring 18 hours from each user for building a detailed profile 4 . We expect around 200 attributes suffice since some of the questions are for consistency check. Figure 7a shows that matching (without reconstructing the secret) by our TST construction finishes in just a few seconds.
Oblivious Transfer with Access Control
OT with access control (OTAC) is introduced by Camenisch et al. [8] . Their construction supports conjunctive policy and is based on a specific construction which covers the credential and the encryption mechanisms.
Our TST enables for the first time OT with threshold access control, in a modular manner. The initial setup and execution of our approach are similar to those considered by Camenisch et al. [8] . The server encrypts each data item p i by a homomorphic encryption into e i under the server public key. The server publishes all these ciphertexts. The client can use private informa-tion retrieval (PIR) technique to get e i of interest, rerandomizes it by a factor r, and sends it to the server. Now, the decryption result of this ciphertext is treated as the secret κ of the TST protocol, to be transferred to the client. If the attributes of the client satisfy the threshold policy, r · p i will be transferred.
We need some zero-knowledge proofs, in particular, to prove that the re-randomized ciphertext is originated from the server. This can be done by proving that it is a ciphertext signed by the server which is then randomized by a factor of r, without revealing the signature or r. Also, we need to add the proof for showing that the credential of the client is certifying the attributes which are used as the selection strings in TST. Remarkably, one can plugin any credential scheme and encryption scheme supporting the corresponding zero-knowledge proofs efficiently, which are abundant. We think that it is a conceptually simpler and possibly more efficient approach, yet we enjoy more expressive policy.
At the application level, this class of primitive can find applications in pay-per-download music repository, pay-per-retrieval DNA database, etc. For example, a specific solution based on PIR instead of OT with an integrated payment system has been proposed with these kinds of e-commerce applications in mind [25] .
Publish/Subscribe System
As our protocol is for matching in general, it can also find applications in other scenarios where the transfer of material is based on matching of interests, and the interest may be sensitive to disclose. One example is privacy-preserving content-based publish/subscribe system [36] . For matching interest while preserving its privacy, existing work resorts to computation over encrypted data [36] , or uses attribute-based mechanism for specifying interest as the encryption policy [47] .
Our solution can act as a handy tool in a peer-topeer setting, where there is no authority to setup the attribute-based cryptosystem. Moreover, all our constructions avoid relatively heavyweight pairing operations that are common in attribute-based systems.
Existing PSI(-CA) Applications
TST serves as a better alternative in typical applications utilizing PSI. For example, PSI has been used to enforce fog of war in real-time online games [7] : a player can only see the details of the map as determined by the other player, only if the player has a unit of army nearby. Existing schemes rely on the game logic to determine this nearby condition. TST/STAS allows cryptographic revelation of the fog of war under more flexible criteria, e.g., different units with different visibility.
Consider another example of joint promotion by two companies which share some common customers. They should protect the customer lists before confirming that cooperation is beneficial (say, knowing the number of common customers is over a threshold). PSI-CA can be a solution. However, not all customers are equal, a company may assign different weights according to purchase history, etc. In general, STAS provides a flexible yet privacy-preserving solution: a company can specify the policy for matching, with the policy kept private.
Applications like location-based services and biometric pattern matching, etc., benefit from our new primitive as we allow more fine-grained control over "proximity" and "similarity", which is not easily supported by traditional PSI-based solutions.
Conclusion and Future Work
We formulate the notion of secret transfer with access structure (STAS), and propose two constructions based on oblivious polynomial evaluation and a new variant of garbled Bloom filter respectively. The first scheme is secure in the malicious model, while the second one is more efficient. We then show how to use STAS to construct private set-intersection with access structure, which is the first of its kind to the best of our knowledge. Further applications of STAS are also discussed.
This work leaves a number of open problems: improving efficiency of our malicious model construction, considering stronger models such as universal composability, and constructing t-PSI which does not leak the size of intersection, without resorting to obfuscation. We hope to see our work enables more new applications.
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Appendix A Secure 2PC
We use the simulation-based security definition for twoparty computation (2PC). More details can be referred to [20] . A 2PC protocol π computes a function that maps a pair of inputs to a pair of outputs f : {0, 1} * × {0, 1} * → {0, 1} * × {0, 1} * , where f = (f 1 , f 2 ). For every pair of inputs x, y ∈ {0, 1} * , the output-pair is a random variable (f 1 (x, y), f 2 (x, y) ). The first party obtains f 1 (x, y) and the second party obtains f 2 (x, y).
A.1 The Semi-Honest Setting
We first consider static semi-honest adversaries, which can control one of the two parties and assumed to follow the protocol specification exactly. However, it may try to learn more information about the other party's input.
In the semi-honest model, a protocol π is secure if whatever can be computed by a party in the protocol can be obtained from its input and output only. This is formalized by the simulation paradigm. We require a party's view in a protocol execution to be simulatable given only its input and output. The view of the party i during an execution of π on input (x, y) is denoted by View 
A.2 The Malicious Setting
The adversary might deviate from the protocol execution arbitrarily even at the risk of being caught cheating. The standard way of defining security in such a malicious model is to formalize an ideal process that involves a trusted third party who computes the protocol result directly. A protocol is said to be secure if any adversary in the real protocol execution can be simulated by a simulator in the ideal model. More formally:
In an ideal execution, the two parties submit their inputs to the trusted party who will compute the desired output and send the outputs back. An honest party just directs its true input for the computation to the trusted party, while a malicious party may replace its input with any other value of the same length. As in most of the literature, we do not consider fairness, which means the malicious party can send an abort symbol ⊥ to instruct the trusted party not to deliver the output to the honest party. Let f = (f 1 , f 2 ) be a deterministic function, and A i be a PPT adversary that corrupts party i ∈ {1, 2}, the ideal execution of f on inputs (x, y) and auxiliary input z to A, denoted by Ideal f,Ai(z) (x, y), is defined as the output pair of the honest party and A i .
In the real model, the honest party follows the instructions of the protocol π to interact with A i , who on the other hand may follow any polynomial-time strategy. Let f, A i to be the same as defined above and let π be a 2PC protocol for computing f . Then, the real execution of π on inputs (x, y), auxiliary input z to A i , denoted by Real π,Ai(z) (x, y), is defined as the output vector of the honest party and the adversary A i .
Security. Security is defined by requiring that adversaries (often called simulator in this context) are able to simulate the protocol execution in the real world. 
Appendix B GBF * Algorithms
This section gives the details and analyze our GBF * which is (BuildGBF * , QueryGBF * , GBF * Intersection).
The false positive of GBF * means when querying GBF * X,I with some index i / ∈ I, QueryGBF * () (Algorithm 2) returns some element x ∈ X. It is easy to see that our BuildGBF * () (Algorithm 1) fails only when emptySlot remains unchanged before line 22. Following existing analysis [17] , we have: Theorem 6. Algorithm 1 fails with probability negl(λ).
Theorem 7. The false positive probability is negl(λ).
The underlying idea of our GBF * Intersection (Algorithm 3) is very similar to the GBFIntersection algorithm [17] . Thus Algorithm 3 inherits the corresponding
